Stackelberg Independence by Hinnosaar, Toomas
Stackelberg Independence
Toomas Hinnosaar∗
March 2019†
Abstract
The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity
leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the standard assumptions,
leaders’ actions are informative about market conditions and independent of lead-
ers’ beliefs about the arrivals of followers. However, this Stackelberg independence
property relies on all standard assumptions being satisfied. It fails to hold when-
ever the demand function is non-linear, marginal cost is not constant, goods are
differentiated, firms are non-identical, or there are any externalities. I show that
small deviations from the linear demand assumption may make the leaders’ choices
completely uninformative.
JEL: C72, C73, D43, L13
Keywords: sequential games, oligopolies, Stackelberg leadership model
1 Introduction
How can one determine market characteristics and get early welfare estimates in newly
developing markets? Do these markets require policy interventions? What will the long-
term outcomes look like? In many markets, firms enter and build capacities sequentially.
For example, ride-sharing companies (such as Uber, Lyft, BlaBlaCar, and Taxify) typically
enter each geographic location at different moments in time. A natural model to study
this kind of markets is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model, where firms choose
their quantities (capacities) while observing the moves of earlier entrants.
In this paper, I show that under the standard assumptions of the Stackelberg model,
the questions stated above are easy to answer. The standard assumptions are (1) linear
demand, (2) identical firms, and (3) constant marginal costs and no externalities. Under
these assumptions, there is a simple relationship between the competitive quantity and
leaders’ choices. Without any further knowledge about the model parameters an observer
(such as a regulator or an econometrician) can learn the competitive quantity as soon as
the first entrant makes a choice. This inference does not require the observer or even the
firms to have correct beliefs about the future arrivals of entrants.
∗Collegio Carlo Alberto, toomas@hinnosaar.net.
†The latest version is available at https://toomas.hinnosaar.net/stackelberg.pdf
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I show that this result is driven by Stackelberg independence. I define Stackelberg
independence as a property of sequential games, where each leader behaves independently
of the number of followers. To show the importance of this property, I first prove a limit
result. If it is commonly known that the number of followers is going to be large, so that
the total quantity will be very close to perfectly competitive quantity, then the leaders’
actions are proportional to competitive quantity. This connection holds both with linear
and non-linear demand functions. The reason is simple: near the competitive quantity,
any demand function can be closely approximated by a linear demand function. The
same connection between leaders’ choices and the competitive quantity continues to hold
with a finite number of followers if and only if the leaders’ choices are independent of the
number of followers, i.e. under the Stackelberg independence property.
The second part of the paper provides cautionary results. It shows that all assumptions
of the standard model are necessary for the results to hold. Moreover, I provide an example
that shows that even small deviations from the standard model may make the leaders’
choices uninformative about market conditions. Therefore, one should be cautious with
policy implications from the standard model.
The intuitive reason why the standard model is special is simple. Each potential
entrant affects the incentives of the leader in two ways. First, an additional firm increases
the total equilibrium quantity. This reduces the equilibrium price and, therefore, the
marginal benefit of producing an additional unit. This effect pushes the quantities of all
existing firms downwards. Indeed, in a simultaneous choice model (Cournot oligopoly),
this is exactly what we see—each additional firm increases the total quantity, but reduces
the individual quantities. Second, by increasing its quantity, the leader can discourage
the follower from choosing a large quantity. This discouragement effect pushes leaders’
quantities upwards. It is the reason why leaders typically choose larger quantities than
followers in the Stackelberg model. The Stackelberg independence property is satisfied in
the knife-edge case where the two effects are exactly equal so that additional followers (or
even changed beliefs about the followers) neither increase nor decrease leaders’ optimal
quantities.
The standard model discussed in this paper has been extensively used in the literature.
Daughety (1990) used a two-period model with some leaders and some followers to study
the benefits of concentration. The model has been later used and extended by Anderson
and Engers (1992); Pal and Sarkar (2001); Lafay (2010); Julien, Musy, and Saïdi (2011,
2012); and Ino and Matsumura (2012) to cover more than two periods and an arbitrary
number of firms in each period. In all those papers, the model has the Stackelberg inde-
pendence property. I extend this literature by showing two results. First, the implications
continue to hold when allowing stochastic arrival processes and arbitrary beliefs about the
arrival process. Second, I show that the characterization result is driven by Stackelberg
independence.
On the other hand, there is a large literature studying sequential games with non-
quadratic payoffs, including Dixit (1987); Robson (1990); Linster (1993); Glazer and Has-
sin (2000); Morgan (2003) and Hinnosaar (2018), whose characterization results do not
exhibit the Stackelberg independence property.1 This means that not all Stackelberg
1For a literature review on Stackelberg games, see Julien (2018), and for sequential contests, see
Konrad (2009).
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leadership models have the Stackelberg independence property. In this paper, I show
that this is not a coincidence—all the assumptions of the standard model are necessary
for Stackelberg independence and the simple characterization obtained in the standard
model.
Methodologically, the paper builds on recent results from aggregative and sequential
games. While the literature on oligopolies is very established, starting from Cournot
(1838) for oligopolies with simultaneous choices and von Stackelberg (1934) in leadership
models, such games with non-linear demand functions have been difficult to handle. In
recent years, the novel results on aggregative games2 have been successfully applied to
shed new light on oligopolies, for example, by Nocke and Schutz (2018). In this paper, I
build on the characterization results from sequential contests from Hinnosaar (2018).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the standard model. I first show
by example with a single leader how the leader’s action is informative and independent
of the number of followers. I then characterize the equilibria for the general case and
discuss the properties of the equilibrium. Section 3 shows how these results are driven
by Stackelberg independence property. Section 4 shows how each of the assumptions in
the standard model is necessary for the results. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are in
appendix A.
2 The Standard Model
There are n firms producing a homogeneous good with constant marginal cost c ≥ 0. The
(inverse) demand function is linear P (X) = a
(
X −X
)
, where X = ∑ni=1 xi is the total
quantity produced by all firms, xi ≥ 0 is the individual quantity of firm i, a > 0, and
X > 0 is the market saturation quantity.
Firms are partitioned into T groups that I call periods. The set of firms arriving in
period t is denoted by It and their number nt = #It. That is, I = (I1, . . . , IT ) is a
partition of n = ∑Tt=1 nt firms. If firm i ∈ It arrives before firm j ∈ Is (i.e. t < s), then
firm i is a leader for firm j and correspondingly firm j is a follower for firm i. Firm i
arriving in period t observes the cumulative quantity of its leaders, i.e. firms that arrived
prior to period t. I denote this cumulative quantity by Xt−1 =
∑t−1
s=1
∑
j∈Is xj. Firm i
chooses xi simultaneously with other firms arriving in period t.
Let x∗i (n) denote the equilibrium quantity of firm i when the sequence of firms is
n = (n1, . . . , nT ). Stackelberg independence is defined as each x∗i (n) being independent
on the sequence of followers nt = (nt+1, . . . , nT ). Formal definition is as follows.
Definition 1 (Stackelberg independence). The model satisfies Stackelberg independence
property if for all sequences n, all periods t, and firms i ∈ It, for each nˆ = (nˆ1, . . . , nˆTˆ )
such that nˆs = ns for all s ≤ t, the equilibrium quantity x∗i (nˆ) = x∗i (n).
One possible sequence of followers is such that there are no followers. Therefore Stack-
elberg independence requires that each firm always behaves as if there are no followers.
For example, if there is a single first-mover (that is n1 = 1) then Stackelberg independence
implies that the first-mover chooses monopoly quantity regardless of the actual sequence
2See Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) and Jensen (2017).
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of followers. Note that the property does not put any restrictions on the off-path behavior,
nor does it prohibit the equilibrium behavior of firm i depending on the number of firms
arriving either at the same period or earlier than firm i.
2.1 Example
Suppose that the inverse demand is linear P (X) = a
(
X −X
)
and the marginal cost
is c ≥ 0. The competitive equilibrium quantity Xc = X − ca solves P (Xc) = c, so
that P (X) − c = a
(
Xc −X
)
. Firms arrive in two periods. In the first period, a single
leader (called firm 1) arrives and chooses quantity x1. In the second period n − 1 ≥ 0
followers arrive, observe x1 and choose their quantities x2, . . . , xn simultaneously. The
total quantity is X = ∑ni=1 xi.
Straightforward calculations show that in equilibrium the best-response of each fol-
lower i > 1 is x∗i (x1) = 1n
(
Xc − x1
)
. Firm 1 takes this into account and solves
max
x1
x1a
(
Xc − x1 −
n∑
i=2
x∗i (x1)
)
= 1
n
max
x1
x1a
(
Xc − x1
)
. (1)
Note that n enters the maximization problem multiplicatively. While n affects the leader’s
profit, it does not affect the maximization problem and the maximizer. The leader’s
optimal quantity is the monopoly quantity x∗1 = Xc2 regardless of n.
The equilibrium quantities for various values of n are illustrated by figure 1. As
n increases, the total equilibrium quantity (marked with circles) raises to competitive
quantity Xc, but the leader’s quantity (solid horizontal line) remains constant at x∗1 = Xc2 .
This is an example of the Stackelberg independence property—the leader’s behavior is
independent of the number of followers.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
n
X∗, x∗1
0
Xc
2
Xc
Figure 1: Equilibria with linear demand function in Stackelberg model with one leader
and n− 1 followers.
Just by observing the leader’s quantity x∗1, an observer can immediately determine
the competitive quantity Xc = X − ca = 2x∗1. This does not require the observer to wait
until the followers have made their choices. Moreover, the observer does not need to know
either the number of followers or what the leader thinks the number of followers is. When
the followers arrive and make their choices, the observer can determine how competitive
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the market is by comparing the total quantity X∗ to the competitive quantity Xc. The
dead-weight loss is proportional to the distance Xc −X∗.
2.2 Equilibria
I now show that all the properties of the previous example generalize to arbitrary sequence
n. Moreover, to formalize the fact that even the beliefs about the arrival process do not
play any role in the equilibrium characterization, I allow a general arrival process and
beliefs in this subsection. In particular, I assume that the sequence n is a random variable
that may come from any distribution. The only restriction that I impose is that no firms
arrive after some finite period T . Then n = (n1, . . . , nT ) and I = (I1, . . . , IT ) denote
realizations of the random process.
Firm i ∈ It that arrives in period t observes the cumulative quantity Xt−1 and the
number of firms arriving in period nt. It may also get some public or private signals.
Using all this information, firm i forms a belief about the future arrival process nt =
(nt+1, . . . , nT ). Note that these beliefs may be different for different firms in the same
period and can depend on Xt−1 as well as on the individual quantities of the leaders.
Proposition 1 (Characterization Result for the Standard Model). The total equilibrium
quantity X∗ and individual quantities (x∗1, . . . , x∗n) are given by
X∗ =
[
1− 1∏T
s=1(1 + ns)
]
Xc, and x∗i =
Xc∏t
s=1(1 + ns)
, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , t},∀i ∈ It. (2)
The proof in appendix A generalizes the example in the previous section using math-
ematical induction. As in the example, the best-response function of the firms in the last
period is linear. Therefore both the total quantity X∗ and the net demand P (X∗) − c
induced by each XT−1 are linear functions of XT−1. Moreover, straightforward calcula-
tions show that net demand is 11+nT a
(
Xc −XT−1
)
. Therefore when firms in period T −1
form an expectation about this object, the term that depends on the number of follow-
ers is multiplicatively separable from the maximization problem and does not affect the
optimum. Standard mathematical induction shows that this is true for all players.
2.3 Properties
As in the example, the general characterization in proposition 1 provides a clear connection
between the actions of the leaders and the model parameters. Just by observing the
choice x∗i of one player i in period t and the number of firms in each period up to period
t, an observer can determine the competitive quantity Xc = X − ca = x∗i
∏t
s=1(1 + ns).
By observing all quantities, the observer can determine Xc − X∗, i.e. distance from the
competitive equilibrium quantity to equilibrium quantity, which is proportional to the
dead-weight loss. Note that these observations are independent on the arrival process and
beliefs about the arrival process.
These properties of the standard model are a consequence of the Stackelberg indepen-
dence property. The maximization problem of each firm is independent of the number
of followers it has. Therefore it is natural that its choice does not depend either on the
number of followers or the belief about their arrival process. In the next section, I show
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that this connection is even deeper. The characterization formulas in proposition 1 hold
more generally in the limit with a large number of followers. Therefore for the same
results to hold for a finite number of players, the choices of the leaders must be the same
with a finite and infinite number of players, i.e. under Stackelberg independence.
3 Competitive Limits and Stackelberg Independence
In this section, I relax the standard model by allowing demand to be non-linear. In
particular, let P (X) be any strictly decreasing and smooth demand function in [0, X],
such that the first-order necessary conditions are also sufficient and there is a saturation
point X such that P (X) = 0 if and only if X ≥ X. This implies that for each c ≥ 0 there
is a unique competitive equilibrium quantity Xc ∈
[
0, X
]
with P (Xc) = c.
3.1 Competitive Limits
The first result establishes leaders’ behavior in competitive limits, where the number of
firms converges to infinity. The first part is intuitive—as the number of firms becomes
large, the total equilibrium quantity converges to competitive quantity Xc. This has been
shown earlier in various settings, for example by Robson (1990) and Hinnosaar (2018).
Note that this aggregate limit is the same regardless of the period in which period the
number of firms converges to infinity.
The limiting behavior of individual firms depends on the period in which the number
of firms is increased. Naturally, if a firm arrives simultaneously with a large number of
firms, they all produce negligible quantities. Similarly, each firm that follows an infinitely
large number of leaders also produces a negligible quantity in the competitive limit.
The novel part of the proposition is the limit behavior of the finite number of leaders.
The leaders’ quantities are uniquely determined by the competitive equilibrium quantity
Xc and the number of firms in each period up to the arrival of this particular leader.
Comparing the limiting quantity of a leader in proposition 2 to the one from the standard
model in proposition 1 reveals that the leaders’ behavior is identical in both cases. This
is natural, as the non-linear function could be closely approximated by a linear function
near the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Competitive Limits). Let Xc = P−1(c) be the competitive equilibrium
quantity with inverse demand P (X) and marginal cost c ≥ 0. Fix a sequence n =
(n1, . . . , nT ) and let us increase nt in a particular period t. Then the limiting total quantity
limnt→∞X∗(n) = Xc and individual quantities for each firm i ∈ Is are
lim
nt→∞
x∗i (n) =
0 ∀s ≥ t,Xc∏s
k=1(1+nk)
∀s < t. (3)
The proof is in appendix A, but to illustrate the argument let me discuss the single
leader case studied in section 2.1, i.e. n = (1, n − 1) with n → ∞ here. The followers
observe x1 and maximize xi (P (X)− c). Combining their optimality conditions gives
an equation that defines total equilibrium quantity X∗(x1) for any given x1, optimality
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condition for firm i is x∗i = −P (X
∗(x1))−c
P ′(X∗(x1)) = g (X
∗(x1)). Adding up the conditions for all
followers gives a condition
x∗1 = X∗(x1)− (n− 1)g (X∗(x1)) , (4)
which implicitly defines the aggregate best-response function of all followers. Inserting
this into the maximization problem of the leader and taking the optimality conditions
gives an equilibrium condition
X∗ = ng (X∗)− (n− 1)g′ (X∗) g (X∗) . (5)
Clearly, as n→∞, the left-hand X∗ → Xc and g(X∗)→ g(Xc) = 0. Moreover,
lim
n→∞ g
′(X∗) = − [P
′(Xc)]2 − [P (Xc)− c]P ′′(Xc)
[P ′(Xc)]
= −1.
Therefore the limit of equation (5) implies that limn→∞ ng(X∗) = Xc2 . Taking the limit
from the leader’s equilibrium quantity defined by equation (4) gives
lim
n→∞x
∗
1 = limn→∞ng(X
∗) = Xc2 .
3.2 Stackelberg Independence
The combination of the limit result with the Stackelberg independence property gives a
precise prediction for the equilibrium behavior of firms. Namely, all firms in periods s < T
may potentially have a large number of followers. By Stackelberg independence, their
equilibrium behavior must be independent of the number of followers, so their equilibrium
quantity must always be equal to the limit found in proposition 2. This is stated as
corollary 1.
Corollary 1 (Competitive Limits and Stackelberg Independence). If the model has the
Stackelberg independence property, then for all s < T and all i ∈ Is,
x∗i =
Xc∏s
k=1(1 + nk)
. (6)
Note that the behavior of the firms in the last period is not determined by corollary 1,
as they do not have any followers and therefore Stackelberg independence has no impli-
cations on their behavior. If we extend the argument slightly, by allowing the possibility
that they may also have followers and therefore their behavior is also characterized by
equation (6), we can add up all equilibrium quantities and get a unique prediction for the
total equilibrium quantity
X∗ =
[
1− 1∏T
k=1(1 + nk)
]
Xc.
4 Necessary Conditions
In this section, I show that the assumptions of the standard model discussed above are
necessary for the results. I relax the assumptions of the standard model one-by-one and
show that the Stackelberg independence property fails.
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4.1 Linearity
The first main assumption of the standard model is that the demand function is lin-
ear. More precisely, the difference between demand and marginal cost is linear, i.e.
P (X)−c = a
(
Xc −X
)
. Relaxing this assumption, I assume that P (X) is a continuously
differentiable (but possibly non-linear) function that satisfies the regularity conditions so
that the equilibrium is interior and the second-order conditions for each firm are satisfied.
The following result shows that if the Stackelberg independence property holds at least
for two-period deterministic arrival processes n = (n1, n2) and for all constant marginal
costs c ≥ 0, then the function P (X)− c must be linear in X.
Proposition 3 (Linearity is Necessary). Suppose for all c ≥ 0, all n = (n1, n2) the
model has the Stackelberg independence property. Then P (X)− c = a
(
Xc −X
)
for some
a > 0, Xc > 0.
The proof is in appendix A. Let me illustrate the key ideas of the proof. First,
proposition 2 gives a unique prediction of the leaders’ total equilibrium quantity, X∗1 =
n1Xc
1+n1 for any n1 ≥ 1 and any c ≥ 0, whereXc = P−1(c) is the competitive quantity. On the
other hand, in n1-player Cournot oligopoly the equilibrium quantity is characterized by
the condition X∗ = n1g(X∗, c), where g(X, c) = −P (X)−cP ′(X) . According to the Stackelberg
independence assumption, these two quantities must coincide, which gives a condition
that relates n1, c and the demand function through g(X, c) function and Xc,
n1Xc
1 + n1
= g
(
n1Xc
1 + n1
, c
)
.
The rest of the proof uses this condition to identify the shape of the demand function
P (X). It shows that at any point X ∈
(
0, X
)
, its derivative P ′(X) = P ′(0). As P is
assumed to be continuously differentiable, it implies that P is indeed linear.
Mathematical Intuition. Let me also discuss the mathematical intuition of this result
more formally. Hinnosaar (2018) provides a general characterization for this type of
sequential games with non-quadratic payoffs. The total equilibrium quantity X∗ is defined
by equation
X∗ =
T∑
k=1
Sk(n)gk(X∗),
where S1(n), . . . , ST (n) are integers that capture the informativeness of the game n =
(n1, . . . , nT ) and g1, . . . , gT are defined recursively as
g1(X) = g(X) = −P (X)− c
P ′(X) , gk+1(X) = −g
′
k(X)g(X),∀k = 1, . . . , T − 1.
The gk(X∗) terms capture the higher-order strategic substitutability of quantities. In
particular, g1(X∗) captures the fact that increasing the quantity slightly reduces the
marginal benefit of firms’ own quantity. It is weighted by S1(n) = n, i.e. the number of
firms. Next, g2(X∗) captures the fact that increase in the leader’s quantity reduces the
marginal benefits for all its followers, therefore discouraging them. This term is multiplied
8
by S2(n), which counts the number of all leader-follower pairs in the model. The other
terms capture the same idea, but at a higher order. For example, g3(X∗) captures the
fact if firm i increases its quantity and firm j observes this and responds, then it affects
the benefits for all j’s followers. Therefore i also has two-step indirect influences. Again,
each such term gk(X∗) is weighted by the total number of k-step paths in the model.
Each additional follower typically adds influences on all levels.
The equilibrium quantity of firm i arriving in period t is
x∗i =
[
1−
T−t∑
k=1
Sk(nt)g′k(X∗)
]
g(X∗) = g1(X∗) +
T+1−t∑
k=2
Sk−1(nt)gk(X∗),
where S1(nt), . . . , ST−t(nt) capture the informativeness of the remainder game after the
move of player i, i.e. nt = (nt+1, . . . , nT ), and g1, . . . , gT−t are defined as above, with the
same interpretation.
Each additional follower increases the total quantity X∗, which therefore reduces firm
i’s incentive to increase quantity. This effect works by reducing gk(X∗) terms, which
are strictly decreasing in the case of higher-order strategic substitutes. However, it also
increases informativeness of nt, which means that firm i influences more firms. This
increases x∗i directly. Depending on the demand function, the comparison of these two
opposite effects can go in either direction.
In the case of linear demand, these two effects are exactly equal. Namely, if P (X) =
a
(
X −X
)
, then g(X) = Xc −X, where Xc = X − ca > 0, and therefore each gk(X) =
Xc −X. Combining these, we get that
X∗ = (Xc −X∗)
T∑
k=1
Sk(n)⇒ Xc −X∗ = Xc1 +∑Tk=1 Sk(n) =
Xc∏T
k=1(1 + nk)
and
x∗i = (Xc −X∗)
[
1 +
T−t∑
k=1
Sk(nt)
]
= Xc∏T
k=1(1 + nk)
T∏
k=t+1
(1 + nk) =
Xc∏t
k=1(1 + nk)
,
which are the same expressions we derived above and are indeed independent of the
number of followers nt = (nt+1, . . . , nT ). However, note that the fact that the terms
involving nt canceled out in the expression relied on the fact that all the information
measures Sk(n) had an equal weight gk(X∗) = Xc−X∗, which means that all direct and
indirect substitutability effects were equal. This is not the case for non-linear demand
functions or other deviations from the standard linear model, therefore there is no reason
to expect these terms to vanish.
4.2 Example with a Non-Linear Function
The following example shows that even small deviations from the standard model may
make the leaders’ actions completely uninformative. Consider the same example as in
section 2.1, but with a small modification in the demand function. Instead of a linear
function, let the demand be P (X) = a
(
X −X
)
−ε sin(kpiX), where k ∈ N, pi ≈ 3.14159,
and ε > 0 is sufficiently small so that the regularity conditions are satisfied (the demand is
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still linear and the equilibrium interior). By construction, the competitive quantity is still
Xc and the new demand function differs from the original linear demand function at most
by ε. Therefore by taking a small ε, we can closely approximate the original function. On
the other hand, by increasing k > 0, we can increase the first- and second-order derivatives
of P , which play an important role in equilibrium characterization.
The total equilibrium quantity X∗ is given by equation (5) and the leader’s quantity
by equation (4). To see how non-linearity changes the result, let us consider k = 4 and
two values ε = ±0.023a. This means that we consider two small deviations from the
linear demand curve that are still visible on figure 2a.
X
P − c
Xc
2
Xc
aXc
0
0
n = 1
n = 2
(a) Demand function
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
n
X∗, x∗1
0
Xc
2
Xc
(b) Equilibrium quantities
Figure 2: Equilibria with demand functions P (X) = a
(
X −X
)
± 0.023a sin(5piX) in
Stackelberg model with one leader and n− 1 followers.
Figure 2a illustrates why the conclusions differ in the case of non-linear demand. First,
if n = 1, i.e. the leader is a monopolist, then near the original monopoly quantity Xc2 ,
the slopes of the two non-linear demand curves differ. When ε < 0 (the solid blue line)
the slope near Xc2 is steeper than −1, therefore the monopoly quantity is now lower than
0.5. On the other hand, when ε > 0 (the dashed red line) the curve is less steep than
the original demand curve, which pushes the monopoly quantity towards the right. These
three monopoly quantities are denoted by vertical lines in the middle of figure 2a. As
we can see, relatively small differences in the demand curves lead to visible numerical
differences in monopoly quantities.
Next, if there is one follower (n = 2), then the total equilibrium quantity is closer
to the competitive quantity Xc (the three vertical lines towards the right). Near the
original equilibrium quantity 34Xc, the ε < 0 case (the solid blue line) has a less elastic
demand and thus higher total equilibrium quantity than the linear curve and ε > 0 case
(the dashed red line) has a more elastic demand and therefore lower total quantity. The
leader’s corresponding quantities for ε < 0 and for ε > 0 are now reversed in order and
differ significantly.
Figure 2b shows the leader’s and the total equilibrium quantity as a function of the
number of firms. It shows that the number of followers has a significant impact on
the equilibrium behavior of the leader, so we do not have Stackelberg independence here.
Moreover, the leader’s equilibrium quantity is significantly higher or lower than Xc2 even in
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the case of the same demand function. This means that now we cannot conclude that much
from the leader’s quantity x∗1. Its connection with the competitive quantity Xc depends
on the leader’s expectation about the number of followers and the particular shape of the
demand function. Indeed, suppose that the observer knows that the demand function
is one of the two non-linear curves indicated in figure 2a, say with equal probabilities.
Then for each X, the expected price is P (X) = a
(
Xc −X
)
, i.e. in expectation, the curve
is linear, with an error term less than 0.005. The total equilibrium quantity behaves as
one would expect, converging to competitive quantity. However, the leader’s quantity
x∗1 depends largely on the particular demand function and also the expected number of
followers.
Finally, figure 3 describes the same calculations for ε = 0.00025 and k = 100. As
the figure illustrates, the demand curve is now virtually indistinguishable from the linear
curve (having nevertheless sizable derivatives). Vertical lines in Figure 3a show that the
leader’s action when n is either 1, 2, or 3 differs significantly and figure 3b shows that
the same pattern continues for larger n and the convergence to Xc2 is slow as n → ∞.
Therefore the leader’s action can be uninformative and depends heavily on n even when
the demand function is very close to linear.
X
P − c
Xc
2
Xc
aXc
0
0 n = 1
n = 2
n = 3
(a) Demand function
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
n
X∗, x∗1
0
Xc
2
Xc
(b) Equilibrium quantities
Figure 3: Equilibria with demand function P (X) = a
(
X −X
)
− 0.00025a sin(100piX) in
Stackelberg model with one leader and n− 1 followers.
4.3 Identical Firms
The second main assumption of the standard model is that the firms are identical. In
this section, I relax this assumption while keeping the other assumptions of the standard
model unchanged. I assume that each firm i may have a different constant marginal
cost ci ≥ 0 and a different linear inverse demand function Pi(X) = ai
(
X
i −X
)
. The
latter captures the possibility that the firms may operate under different tax rules or have
different incentive structures for the decision-makers. Under these assumptions, we can
rewrite Pi(X)− ci = ai
(
X
i
c −X
)
, where X ic = X
i− ci
ai
is the total quantity at which firm
i would earn zero profit. Note that ai affects the payoff multiplicatively and therefore
does not affect the equilibrium behavior. The only relevant parameter is, therefore, X ic.
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As above, I assume parameters X ic are commonly known and for simplicity, I focus on
the deterministic arrival processes. Moreover, I assume that the differences in X ic are
sufficiently small, so that in equilibrium all firms choose an interior solution to their
maximization problem.3
For a formal statement, I use Stackelberg independence in a specific comparison. The
statement requires that for arbitrary sequential oligopoly n (with linear payoffs as de-
scribed above) adding one follower at the end does not change any of the equilibrium
choices of previously existing firms. In particular, if the relevant parameter for the added
firm is Xc, then for all its leaders X
i
c = Xc is necessary for the equilibrium behavior to
be unchanged.
Proposition 4 (Identical Firms are Necessary). Suppose that the equilibrium quantities
in sequential oligopoly n = (n1, . . . , nT ) with parameters (X
i
c)ni=1 are x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗n)
and these quantities remain the same when adding a firm with parameter Xc on period
T + 1. Then X ic = Xc for all firms.
The proof is in appendix A. To illustrate the argument, let us compare a monopoly
and a two-firm Stackelberg model. The monopolist maximizes x1a1
(
X
1
c − x1
)
and the
monopoly quantity is x∗1 =
X
1
c
2 . With two sequential oligopolists, the follower’s best-
response function is x∗2(x1) = 12
[
Xc − x1
]
. Therefore the leader maximizes
max
x1
x1
(
X
1
c − x1 − x∗2(x1)
)
= 12 maxx1 x1
(
X
1
c − x1 +X1c −Xc
)
.
This problem is equivalent to the monopoly problem and gives the same solution as the
monopoly problem if and only if the last two terms cancel out, i.e. X1c = Xc.
4.4 No Other Quadratic Payoffs
The remaining assumptions of the standard model are about externalities and non-
constant marginal costs. I address these issues by allowing the payoff function of each
firm to be a symmetric but more general quadratic function in the following form4
pii(x) = α0 + α1xi − α22 x
2
i + β1
∑
j 6=i
xj − β2
∑
j 6=i
xixj. (7)
Let me first give a few comments about this class of functions. First, under the assumption
that the equilibrium is interior (i.e. satisfying the first-order optimality conditions), the
parameter α0 is irrelevant. Second, this formulation allows quadratic costs, where the
marginal cost is either linearly increasing or decreasing. Third, the formulation makes
it possible to study oligopolies with differentiated products, where the inverse demand
function of firm i is Pi(x) = a(X − xi) − b∑j 6=i xj. When b = a, the products are
3If Xic  X
j
c, for example, because cj  ci, then it is to be expected that there could be equilibria
where i wants to deter j’s entry by choosing a quantity that makes entry unprofitable. In this case,
Stackelberg independence is clearly not satisfied, as without j’s existence i would choose a lower quantity.
4For a discussion about the use and foundations of quadratic games, see Lambert, Martini, and
Ostrovsky (2017).
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homogeneous (i.e. perfect substitutes), if b < a they are imperfect substitutes, and if
b < 0 they are complements. Finally, if β1 6= 0 then there are direct payoff externalities.
The following proposition 5 shows that all these extensions would violate Stackelberg
independence.
Proposition 5 (No Other Quadratic Payoffs). Suppose that the Stackelberg independence
property is non-trivially satisfied for all n = (n1, n2) and the payoff of player i is given
by equation (7). Then α2 = 2β2 and β1 = 0 and therefore we can express pii(x) =
xia
(
Xc −X
)
.
Proof For a fixedX1, combining the first-order optimality conditions of all firms in period
2 gives the total quantity as a function of X1, which is
X∗(X1) =
n2α1 + (α2 − β2)X1
n2β2 + (α2 − β2) .
Inserting this into the optimization problem of the leaders and solving for the equilibrium
conditions gives their total equilibrium quantity
X∗1 =
α1(α2 − β2)n1 − α1(α2 − 2β2)n2 − β1β2n1n2
(α2 − β2 + n1β2) (α2 − β2) (8)
Non-trivial Stackelberg independence requires that this expression is independent on n2
for all n1, but is not always 0. The non-triviality requires that α1 6= 0 and α2 6= β2.
Requirement that α1(α2 − 2β2) = 0 implies therefore that α2 = 2β2. Finally, β1β2 = 0
implies that either β1 = 0 or β2 = 0, but the previous two observations exclude the
possibility that β2 = 0. Therefore indeed β1 = 0 and α2 = 2β2. Inserting this into
equation (7) and noting that α0 does not affect interior equilibria gives the representation
pii(x) = α1xi − β2x2i − β2
∑
j 6=i
xixj = xiβ2
(
α1
β2
−X
)
.
5 Discussion
This paper studies the standard model of sequential capacity choices. Standard assump-
tions are often made for tractability and not necessarily because of empirical validity:
firms are identical, demand is linear, marginal costs are constant, and there are no exter-
nalities. I show that in this standard model, leaders’ actions are informative about the
markets due to the Stackelberg independence property. Just by observing a single en-
trant, an observer can deduce the competitive quantity, and it is easy to construct a good
welfare measure just by observing the equilibrium quantity choices. Moreover, under the
standard assumptions, these arguments are independent of the arrival process and even
firms’ beliefs about the arrival process.
The second part of the paper bears negative results. Namely, it shows that all the
assumptions of the standard model are necessary for the conclusions. Moreover, an ex-
ample shows that even small deviations from standard assumptions may lead to large
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changes in behavior, making the leaders’ choices uninformative about the market condi-
tions. Therefore, one should be careful with making the standard assumptions just for
tractability.
These results highlight that the standard assumptions used in the literature cover only
the knife-edge case where different incentives balance out. An additional follower increases
the equilibrium quantity and therefore reduces the incentive to choose high quantities for
all firms, whereas having more followers motivates leaders to raise their quantities to
discourage followers from raising theirs. These effects cancel each other out only when
the demand is linear. Similarly, if the follower has a higher or lower cost than the leader
or if the goods are non-homogeneous or there are externalities, then these effects do not
cancel out even in the case of linear net demand functions.
I did not discuss a few other standard assumptions that can be relaxed and would
also affect Stackelberg independence. I maintained the assumption that the equilibrium
is interior, which requires that there are no fixed costs (or they are small) and firms do not
differ much. However, if the fixed costs are large or if the differences between firms’ payoffs
are significant, then entry and entry deterrence become strategic questions. Of course, this
would make Stackelberg independence even less likely to hold. Similarly, I assumed that
there is common knowledge about firms’ payoffs and other model characteristics. Relaxing
this is also possible and one implication would be that Stackelberg independence continues
to hold with interim-identical firms, i.e. firms that may differ in realization, but at the
moment of their decision, they expect followers to be similar to them.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof Firm i in the last period T observes XT−1 and knows both nT and the fact that
there are no followers. Therefore its maximization problem is
max
xi
xia
(
Xc −X
)
⇒ x∗i = Xc −X∗(XT−1),
where X∗(XT−1) is the total quantity induced by XT−1 if all firms in period T behave
optimally. Combining all the optimality constraints gives us
∑
i∈IT
x∗i = X∗(XT−1)−XT−1 = nT
(
Xc −X∗(XT−1)
)
⇐⇒ X∗(XT−1) = nTXc +XT−11 + nT .
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Now take firm i in period T − 1. An important object in its maximization problem is
P (X∗(XT−1)) − c, i.e. the per-unit realized profit, assuming that after its choice, the
cumulative quantity is XT−1 and followers behave optimally. Note that since the number
of followers is random, firm i takes expectation of this term according to its beliefs, i.e.
Ei [P (X∗(XT−1))− c] = Eia
(
Xc −X∗(XT−1))
)
= a
(
Xc −XT−1
)
Ei
1
1 + nT
.
Therefore the expected profit of firm i is xia
(
Xc −XT−1
)
Ei 11+nT , which is the same
problem as if the game would end after period T − 1.
I prove the proposition by induction. Suppose that at period t, each player i expects
that cumulative quantity Xt induces Ei [P (X∗(Xt))− c] = a
(
Xc −Xt
)
Ei 1∏T
s=t+1(1+ns)
(note: we already verified this for t = T and t = T − 1). Then i maximizes
max
xi
Eixi [P (X∗(Xt))− c] = aEi 1∏T
s=t+1(1 + ns)
max
xi
xi
(
Xc −Xt
)
.
This is clearly independent on nt. Combining optimality conditions x∗i = Xc −X∗t leads
to the cumulative equilibrium quantity after period t induced by Xt−1, which I denote by
X∗t (Xt−1).
∑
i∈It
x∗i = X∗t (Xt−1)−Xt−1 = Xc −X∗t (Xt−1) ⇐⇒ X∗t (Xt−1) =
ntXc +Xt−1
1 + nt
.
Taking the expectation from the perspective of firm i ∈ It−1 indeed gives
Ej [P (X∗(X∗t (Xt−1))− c] = a
(
Xc −Xt−1
)
Ej
1∏T
k=t(1 + nk)
.
Using these results and the fact that cumulative quantity in the beginning of the game
is X0 = 0, we get that X∗1 (0) = n1Xc1+n1 , therefore for each i ∈ I1 the equilibrium quantity
is x∗i = Xc1+n1 . Then the total quantity at the second period is X
∗
2 (X∗1 (0)) − X∗1 (0) =
n2Xc+X∗1 (0)
1+n2 − X∗1 (0) = n2Xc(1+n1)(1+n2) and therefore for each i ∈ I2 we get x∗i = Xc(1+n1)(1+n2) .
By the same argument, for each i ∈ It, we have x∗i = Xc∏t
s=1(1+ns)
and
X∗ = X∗T (X∗T−1(. . . (X∗1 (0)) . . . )) =
[
1− 1∏T
s=1(1 + ns)
]
Xc.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof By Hinnosaar (2018), the total equilibrium quantity is characterized by
X∗ =
T∑
k=1
Sk(n)gk(X∗), (9)
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where g1, . . . , gk are recursively defined as g1(X) = g(X) = −P (X)−cP ′(X) and gk+1(X) =
−g′k(X)g(X), and Sk(n) denotes the number of level-k observations5 in game n. The
equilibrium quantity of firm i arriving in period s is
x∗i = f ′s(X∗)g(X∗) = g(X∗)
[
1−
T−s∑
k=1
Sk(ns)g′k(X∗)
]
(10)
Hinnosaar (2018) also shows that limnt→∞X∗ = Xc. The following lemma 1 shows that
the limits gk(Xc) = 0 and g′k(Xc) = −1 for all k.
Lemma 1. For all k = 1, . . . , T , gk(Xc) = 0 and g′k(Xc) = −1.
Proof Clearly g1(Xc) = g(Xc) = −P (Xc)−cP ′(Xc) = 0 and
g′1(Xc) = g′(Xc) = −
[P ′(Xc)]2 − [P (Xc)− c]P ′′(Xc)
[P ′(Xc)]2
= −1− g(Xc)P
′′(Xc)
P ′(Xc)
= −1.
Suppose that gk(Xc) = 0 and g′k(Xc) = −1. Then
gk+1(Xc) = −g′k(Xc)g(Xc) = 0
g′k+1(Xc) = −g′′k(Xc)g(Xc)− g′k(Xc)g′(Xc) = 0− (−1)(−1) = −1.
Define n−t = (n1, . . . , nt−1, nt+1, . . . , nT ), i.e. the sequence n with nt left out. Note
that Sk(n) is the number level-k observations in n, which can be computed by first taking
all level-k observations in the subsequence n−t and then adding the new observations
involving nt, of which there are nt times Sk−1(n−t).6 Taking the limit nt → ∞ from
equation (9) then leads to
Xc = lim
nt→∞
T∑
k=1
[Sk(n−t) + ntSk−1(n−t)] gk(X∗) =
T∑
k=1
Sk−1(n−t) lim
nt→∞
ntg(X∗), (11)
as Sk(n−t) and Sk−1(n−t) are independent of nt and thus finite integers, and gk(X∗) =
−g′k−1(X∗)g(X∗), where limnt→∞ g′k−1(X∗) = −1.
The next lemma 2 shows that we can rewrite the sum of the measures Sk in a more
convenient product form.
Lemma 2. 1 +∑Tk=1 Sk(n) = ∏Tk=1(1 + nk).
Proof Proof is again by induction. If T = 1, then 1+∑1k=1 Sk(n) = 1+S1(n1) = 1+n1.
Suppose the claim holds for T−1-period games. Then for T -period game n = (n1, . . . , nT )
T∑
k=1
Sk(n) =
T∑
k=1
[nTSk−1(n−T ) + Sk(n−T )] =
T∑
k=1
Sk(n−T ) + nT
T∑
k=1
Sk−1(n−T ).
5S1(n) is the number of players, S2(n) is the number of players observing other players, etc.
6For notational convenience, S0(·) is always 1 and ST (n−t) = 0 as there cannot be any level-T
observations.
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As n−T is a T − 1-period game, ST (n−T ) = 0 and the induction assumption gives us
1 +
T∑
k=1
Sk(n−T ) = 1 +
T−1∑
k=1
Sk(n−T ) =
T−1∏
k=1
(1 + nk)
Also, S0(n−T ) = 1, so
T∑
k=1
Sk−1(n−T ) = 1 +
T∑
k=2
Sk−1(n−T ) = 1 +
T−1∑
k=1
Sk(n−T ) =
T−1∏
k=1
(1 + nk).
Combining these observations,
1 +
T∑
k=1
Sk(n) =
T−1∏
k=1
(1 + nk) + nT
T−1∏
k=1
(1 + nk) =
T∏
k=1
(1 + nk).
Using the representation from lemma 2, we can rewrite
T∑
k=1
Sk−1(n−t) = 1 +
T−1∑
k=1
Sk(n−t) =
∏T
k=1(1 + nk)
(1 + nt)
Inserting this expression to equation (11) gives
lim
nt→∞
ntg(X∗) =
Xc∑T
k=1 Sk−1(n−t)
= (1 + nt)Xc∏T
k=1(1 + nk)
. (12)
Take firm i ∈ Is in period s, whose equilibrium quantity is characterized by equation (10).
Taking the limit
lim
nt→∞
x∗i = g(Xc)−
T−s∑
k=1
g′k(Xc) limnt→∞Sk(n
s)g(X∗) =
T−s∑
k=1
lim
nt→∞
Sk(ns)g(X∗). (13)
There are two cases. If t ≤ s, then nt is not included in ns, so each Sk(ns) is a finite integer
and therefore Sk(ns)g(X∗) converges to Sk(ns)g(Xc) = 0. Therefore limnt→∞ x∗i = 0. The
second case is when t > s, which is the case when player i belongs to a finite set of leaders
and is followed by an infinite number of followers. Then we can rewrite equation (13) as
lim
nt→∞
x∗i =
T−s∑
k=1
lim
nt→∞
[ntSk−1(ns−t) + Sk(ns−t)]g(X∗) =
T−s∑
k=1
Sk−1(ns−t) limnt→∞ntg(X
∗).
Rewriting ∑T−sk=1 Sk−1(ns−t) using representation from lemma 2 and inserting limit from
equation (12) gives
lim
nt→∞
x∗i =
∏T
k=s+1(1 + nk)
(1 + nt)
(1 + nt)Xc∏T
k=1(1 + nk)
= Xc∏s
k=1(1 + nk)
.
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A.3 Proof of proposition 3
Let Xc = P−1(c) denote the competitive quantity, so that P (Xc) = c.
Proof Consider the case when n2 = 0, i.e. there are n1 ≥ 1 firms who make a simultaneous
choice. Each firm maximizes maxxi≥0 xi[P (X) − c]. The equilibrium is defined the first-
order conditions for all firms
P (X∗)− cx∗iP ′(X∗) = 0 ⇐⇒ x∗i = g(X∗, c),
where for brevity I denote g(X, c) = −P (X)−c
P ′(X) . Adding up the conditions for all firms gives∑
i∈I1
x∗i = X∗ = n1g(X∗, c). (14)
By Stackelberg independence, the total quantity of the n1 leaders must be the same for
any n2. Corollary 1 shows that it must be equal to X∗1 = n1Xc1+n1 . This gives a condition for
c ≥ 0, n1 ∈ N,
n1Xc
1 + n1
= n1g
(
n1Xc
1 + n1
, c
)
. (15)
From this, we can determine some properties of g(X, c), which in turn identifies the
properties of the demand function P (X). Fix any X ∈
(
0, X2
)
. By taking c = P (2X) and
n1, we can ensure that Xc = 2X and therefore equation (15) takes the form
1Xc
1 + 1 = X = g(X, c). (16)
Now, take any n1 ≥ 1 and some c′. The total equilibrium quantity in n1-player Cournot
model must then be n11+n1Xc′ =
n1
1+n1P
−1(c′). Note that this is a continuous and monotone
function of c′, which takes value n11+n1Xc >
Xc
2 = X when c
′ = c and 0 when c′ → ∞.
Therefore there exists c′ such that the equilibrium quantity is exactly n11+n1Xc′ = X. The
equilibrium condition equation (14) is X = n1g(X, c′). Finally, note that by definition,
g(X, c) = −P (X)− c
P ′(X) ⇒ P
′(X) = −P (X)− c
g(X, c) ,
g(X, c′) = −P (X)− c
′ + c− c
P ′(X) = g(X, c)
[
1− c
′ − c
P (X)− c
]
= X
[
1− c
′ − c
P (X)− c
]
.
Inserting this function and the values c = P (Xc) = P (2X) and c′ = P (Xc′) = P
(
1+n1
n1
X
)
to the equilibrium condition gives
X = n1g(X, c′) = n1X
1− P
(
1+n1
n1
X
)
− P (2X)
P (X)− P (2X)
 ,
which is equivalent to
P (2X)− P (X) = n1
[
P
(
X + X
n1
)
− P (X)
]
(17)
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Suppose that n1 = 2. Then applying equation (17) on 23X gives
P (X) = 12P
(2
3X
)
+ 12P
(4
3X
)
.
Similarly, when n1 = 3, the applying equation (17) on 34X gives
P (X) = 23P
(3
4X
)
+ 13P
(3
2X
)
Combining the previous two equations we get
P (2X)− P (X) = 2
[
P (X)− P
(1
2X
)]
. (18)
On the other hand, n1 →∞ in equation (17) gives
lim
n1→∞
P
(
X + X
n1
)
− P (X)
X
n1
= P ′(X) = 1
X
[P (2X)− P (X)] .
Combining this with equation (18), we get
P ′(X) = 1
X
[P (2X)− P (X)] = 2
X
[
P (X)− P
(
X
2
)]
= 2
2
X
[
P
(
X
2
)
− P
(
X
22
)]
= 2
k
X
[
P
(
X
2k−1
)
− P
(
X
2k
)]
= 2 lim
k→∞
P
(
X
2k−1
)
− P (0)
X
2k−1
− lim
k→∞
P
(
X
2k
)
− P (0)
X
2k
= 2P ′(0)− P ′(0) = P ′(0).
That is, for all X ≤ X2 , we must have P ′(X) = P ′(0), i.e. P (X) = P (0) + P ′(0)X. For
all X2 < X ≤ X we can apply equation (18) at X2 and get
P (X) = P
(
2X2
)
= P
(
X
2
)
+ 2
[
P
(
X
2
)
− P
(
X
4
)]
= P (0) + P ′(0)X.
Noting that 0 = P (X) = P (0)+P ′(0)X, so P (0) = P ′(0)X and denoting a = −P ′(0) > 0,
we get that P (X) = a
(
X −X
)
for some a > 0 for all X ∈ [0, X].
A.4 Proof of proposition 4
Proof To compare the two sequential oligopolies in the proposition, i.e. the original T -
period oligopoly and the new T + 1-period oligopoly with an added firm at the end, I
consider sequential oligopoly n = (n1, . . . , nT , nT+1), where nT+1 ∈ {0, 1}. With slight
abuse of notation, I use X∗t (Xt−1) to denote the cumulative quantity after period t, con-
ditional on cumulative quantity prior to period t being Xt−1 and X∗t to denote the cumu-
lative equilibrium quantity on path, i.e. X∗t = X∗t (X∗t−1(. . . (X∗1 (0)) . . . )). Note that the
assumption states that the realized quantities are independent on nT+1.
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If nT+1 = 1, i.e. if there is a firm n+1 who observesXT , then it maximizes xn+1an+1
(
Xc −X
)
,
which gives an best-response function X∗(XT ) = Xc+XT2 . Of course, when nT+1 = 0, we
get that X∗(XT ) = XT . These two cases can be combined by
X∗(XT ) =
nT+1Xc +XT
1 + nT+1
= Xc − Xc −XT1 + nT+1 . (19)
I prove the claim by induction. Fix a period t ≤ T and suppose that at each period
s > t all players i ∈ Is have X ic = Xc. Moreover, suppose that the best-responses of the
followers imply
X∗(Xt) = X∗(X∗T (. . . (XT ) . . . )) = Xc −
Xc −Xt∏T+1
s=t+1(1 + ns)
. (20)
Note that these assumptions are satisfied for t = T as (1) whenever a firm arrives at period
T +1 by assumption it has the parameter Xc, and (2) equation (19). For induction step,
note that each firm i ∈ It maximizes
max
xi
xiai
(
X
i
c −X∗(Xt)
)
= ai∏T+1
s=t+1(1 + ns)
max
xi
xi
(
Xc −Xt +
T+1∏
s=t+1
(1 + ns)(X
i
c −Xc)
)
.
The equilibrium behavior requires that
x∗i (Xt−1) = Xc −X∗t (Xt−1) +
T+1∏
s=t+1
(1 + ns)(X
i
c −Xc).
In particular, on the equilibrium path, i.e. for X∗t−1 by assumption we must have that
x∗i (X∗t−1) and X∗t (X∗t−1) are independent on nT+1. This is only true if X
i
c = Xc. This
establishes the first induction assumption. Suppose now that X ic = Xc for all i ∈ It.
Then combining the optimality conditions we get
X∗t (Xt−1) =
∑
i∈It
x∗i (Xt−1) +Xt−1 = ntXc − ntX∗t (Xt−1) +Xt−1 =
ntXc +Xt−1
1 + nt
.
Inserting this to equation (20) gives
X∗(Xt) = X∗(X∗t (Xt)) = Xc −
Xc −Xt−1∏T+1
s=t (1 + ns)
.
This proves the second part of the induction assumption and therefore completes the
proof.
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